

SECRET

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 08211 01 OF 08 101411Z
ACTION SS-01

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SSO-01 /002 W
-----067752 101412Z /38

O 101316Z MAR 90
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0136
INFO MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD

RELEASE IN FULL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 08 MOSCOW 08211

EXDIS **DECAPTIONED**

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, MARR, PARM, PGOV, NATO, WPO, UR, GC, GE
SUBJECT: SOVIET VIEWS ON THE FUTURE STATUS OF GERMANY:
/ NATO, NEUTRAL OR NEITHER?

REF: A) MOSCOW 5968, B) MOSCOW 6456, C) MOSCOW 7720
/ D) MOSCOW 6198, E) BONN 8004

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS

2. ON MARCH 6 GORBACHEV SAID THE USSR ABSOLUTELY RULED OUT A UNITED GERMANY'S PARTICIPATION IN NATO IN ANY FORM. THIS IS THE STRONGEST STATEMENT TO DATE ON THE QUESTION, BUT WE BELIEVE IT BELIES THE FACT THAT DEBATE CONTINUES IN THE SOVIET UNION OVER THE FUTURE POLITICAL-MILITARY STATUS OF A UNITED GERMANY. ALTHOUGH THE SOVIETS HAVE LEANED TOWARD "NEUTRALITY," THEY REMAIN PUZZLED ABOUT HOW TO ACCOMMODATE GERMAN UNIFICATION AND EUROPEAN STABILITY, WHILE MEETING

SECRET

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Robert Homme, Senior Reviewer

SECRET

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 08211 01 OF 08 101411Z

THEIR OWN DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONCERNS. THE LONG-TERM DESIRES OF THE USSR REGARDING EUROPEAN SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS ARE CLEAR -- THE SOVIETS WISH TO SUPPLANT THE POST-WAR ALLIANCES WITH A NEW SECURITY ARCHITECTURE CONSTRUCTED UNDER CSCE. THE DILEMMA LIES IN THE FACT THAT THE PACE TOWARD GERMAN UNIFICATION NOW FAR EXCEEDS THAT OF STEPS TO ESTABLISH NEW EUROPEAN STRUCTURES.

3. A WIDE RANGE OF POSSIBLE OPTIONS FOR A UNITED

GERMANY EXISTS OVER THE NEAR-TERM -- INCLUDING FULL NATO MEMBERSHIP, AN ASSOCIATED NATO MEMBERSHIP, AND NEUTRALITY, BUT EACH FAILS TO FULLY ADDRESS SOVIET NEEDS. IN DECLARING NATO MEMBERSHIP AS UNACCEPTABLE, GORBACHEV HAS MADE HIS OPENING GAMBIT IN THE TWO PLUS FOUR PROCESS, BUT WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT IS HIS FINAL POSITION. UNDER THEIR CURRENT THINKING, THE SOVIETS SEEMINGLY WOULD LIKE TO SEE A UNITED GERMANY WHICH IS NOT IN NATO, BUT IS CLOSELY ALLIED TO THE U.S. THEY MIGHT ALSO FIND PALATABLE A GERMANY ASSOCIATED WITH NATO, BUT NOT PARTICIPATING IN NATO'S MILITARY STRUCTURE.

4. THE CURRENT SOVIET BOTTOM LINE FOR GERMAN UNIFICATION APPEARS TO BE CONFIRMATION OF EXISTING BORDERS, NO NATO FORCES IN THE EASTERN ZONE, NO GERMAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND A SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE DURING THE TRANSITION. THE PRICE FOR GERMAN NATO MEMBERSHIP (FULL OR ASSOCIATED), HOWEVER, COULD BE APPRECIABLY HIGHER. THIS COULD INCLUDE: NO NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN GERMANY, WITHDRAWAL OF NON-U.S. NATO FORCES FROM GERMANY, CUTTING THE BUNDESWEHR, ECONOMIC INCENTIVES AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO MAINTAIN SOVIET SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 08211 01 OF 08 101411Z

TROOPS IN GERMANY. WHATEVER DECISION IS REACHED REGARDING GERMANY'S POLITICAL-MILITARY STATUS, GORBACHEV MUST BE ABLE TO CONVINCHE HIS PEOPLE THAT ON BALANCE THE SECURITY OF THE USSR HAS NOT DIMINISHED. IN THE COMING MONTHS, WE EXPECT THE SOVIETS WILL CONTINUE EFFORTS TO BRAKE GERMAN UNIFICATION AND TO ACCELERATE THE CSCE PROCESS.

5. WHETHER THE SOVIETS CAN BE PERSUADED TO ACCEPT GERMAN MEMBERSHIP IN NATO IS OPEN TO QUESTION, BUT GORBACHEV HAS SHOWN THAT HE CAN SHIFT FUNDAMENTAL POSITIONS -- EVEN ON GERMANY -- QUICKLY. ALTHOUGH GORBACHEV'S OCTOBER 4 SPEECH IN BERLIN CARRIED INDICATIONS OF GROWING SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO DEAL WITH THE GERMAN ISSUE ON THE BASIS OF REALITY, NOT WISHFUL THINKING, IN DECEMBER THE USSR STILL FIRMLY OPPOSED GERMAN UNIFICATION, ARGUING THAT SUCH A MOVE WOULD THREATEN TO DESTABILIZE THE EUROPEAN BALANCE. GERMAN UNITY IS NOW CONSIDERED A FOREGONE CONCLUSION HERE. THE SOVIETS ARE NOW ARGUING AGAINST NATO MEMBERSHIP FOR A UNITED GERMANY ON THE SAME NATIONAL SECURITY GROUNDS.

END SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS

/

GORBACHEV JUST SAYS "NO"

6. ON MARCH 6 GORBACHEV WAS ASKED WHETHER A UNITED

SECRET

NNNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 08211 02 OF 08 101411Z
ACTION SS-01

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SSO-01 /002 W
-----067765 101413Z /38

O 101316Z MAR 90
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0137
INFO MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 08 MOSCOW 08211

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, MARR, PARM, PGOV, NATO, WPO, UR, GC, GE
SUBJECT: SOVIET VIEWS ON THE FUTURE STATUS OF GERMANY:

GERMANY COULD PARTICIPATE IN ANY FORM IN NATO. HIS
RESPONSE WAS DIRECT AND UNAMBIGUOUS: "WE CANNOT AGREE
TO THAT. IT IS ABSOLUTELY RULED OUT." THIS IS THE
STRONGEST STATEMENT TO DATE ON THE QUESTION, BUT A
TOUGHENING OF THE SOVIET POSITION TOWARD NATO
MEMBERSHIP HAS BEEN EVIDENT SINCE GORBACHEV'S
FEBRUARY 20 STATEMENT THAT ANY UPSETTING OF THE
MILITARY-STRATEGIC BALANCE IS IMPERMISSIBLE, AND THE
MFA COLLEGIUM STATEMENT ON FEBRUARY 24 WHICH
EXPLAINED THAT A UNITED GERMANY IN NATO WOULD UPSET
THAT BALANCE.

7. NEVERTHELESS, GORBACHEV DID NOT ELABORATE AN ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATE PATH FOR A UNITED GERMANY. HE SIMPLY NOTED THAT IF THE EUROPEAN AND VIENNA PROCESSES PROCEEDED, AS WELL AS HELSINKI II, THAT NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT WOULD BE CHANGING FROM MILITARY-POLITICAL INTO POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS AND IN THIS CASE THERE WOULD BE NO NEED FOR BARGAINING AS
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 08211 02 OF 08 101411Z

TO WHERE A UNITED GERMANY WOULD BE.

8. WE BELIEVE THAT GORBACHEV'S DIRECT REJECTION OF GERMAN MEMBERSHIP IN NATO BELIES THAT FACT THAT DEBATE CONTINUES IN MOSCOW OVER THE FUTURE POLITICAL-MILITARY STATUS OF A UNITED GERMANY. THE SOVIETS REMAIN PUZZLED ABOUT HOW TO ACCOMMODATE GERMAN UNIFICATION AND EUROPEAN STABILITY, WHILE MEETING SOVIET DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONCERNS. THIS PROBLEM, WHICH DEPUTY DEFENSE MINISTER SHABANOV TOLD THE AMBASSADOR WAS "THE NUMBER ONE WORRY AT THE MOMENT," OFFERS UP NO EASY SOLUTION FOR THE SOVIETS.

MIXED SIGNALS

9. FOR THE PAST FEW MONTHS THE SOVIETS HAVE SENT MIXED SIGNALS ON THE FUTURE STATUS OF A UNITED GERMANY. IN FACT, IT WAS EVIDENT FROM SHEVARNADZE'S "SEVEN POINTS" ON GERMANY (DETAILED ON DECEMBER 19 IN BRUSSELS BEFORE THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT COMMISSION) THAT THE SOVIETS HAD NO IDEA HOW A UNITED GERMANY WOULD FIT INTO EUROPEAN MILITARY-POLITICAL STRUCTURES. IN PUBLIC, THE SOVIETS HAVE RAILED AGAINST NATO MEMBERSHIP FOR A UNITED GERMANY, FAVORING INSTEAD A "NEUTRAL" GERMANY.

10. THE MESSAGE BEING RECEIVED IN PRIVATE OVER THE PAST FEW WEEKS, HOWEVER, HAS BEEN CLEARLY CONTRADICTORY. FRG AMBASSADOR BLECH (PROTECT) FELT THE SOVIETS WERE SENDING A CLEAR SIGNAL THAT A UNITED GERMANY IN NATO WAS "CATEGORICALLY UNACCEPTABLE;"

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 08211 02 OF 08 101411Z

WHILE AT VIRTUALLY THE SAME TIME GDR AMBASSADOR KOENIG (PROTECT) SAID HE EXPECTED ALL OF GERMANY TO END UP IN NATO, ALBEIT WITH SOME SPECIAL PROVISIONS FOR THE EASTERN ZONE (NO NATO TROOPS, SYMBOLIC

PRESENCE OF SOVIET TROOPS). CZECHOSLOVAK PRESIDENT HAVEL'S DELEGATION GAINED THE IMPRESSION DURING THEIR MEETINGS WITH GORBACHEV AND SHEVARDNADZE THAT MOSCOW WAS DROPPING ITS INSISTENCE THAT GERMANY BE NEUTRAL, WHILE POLISH CONTACTS HERE THOUGHT THE SOVIETS WERE DIGGING IN THEIR HEELS AGAINST NATO MEMBERSHIP. MORE AND MORE, WE HAVE HEARD WORKING-LEVEL CONTACTS AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AND INSTITUTES EXPRESS THE OPINION THAT GERMANY -- IN SOME MANNER -- WILL RETAIN AN AFFILIATION WITH NATO.

WE STILL HAVEN'T HEARD "THE LAST WORD"

11. EVEN AS SOVIET LEADERS HAVE ADOPTED FIRMER POSITIONS, THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT THAT THE GROUND BENEATH THEM REMAINS SOFT AND SHIFTING. IN THE MARCH 2 SOVIET-FRG BILATERALS IN GENEVA, DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER ADAMISHIN REPORTEDLY TOLD FRG POLITICAL DIRECTOR KASTRUP THAT THE USSR WOULD NOT WELCOME A UNITED GERMANY IN NATO, BUT ADMITTED THAT FULL NEUTRALITY WAS NOT REALISTIC. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE SOVIETS HAD NOT YET PRONOUNCED THEIR "LAST WORD ON THIS SUBJECT." RAISING GORBACHEV'S MARCH 6 STATEMENT REJECTING NATO MEMBERSHIP WITH CONTACTS IN THE MFA ARMS LIMITATION AND DISARMAMENT ADMINISTRATION, POLOFFS WERE TOLD THAT HIS REMARKS MUST BE VIEWED "IN

SECRET

NNNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 08211 03 OF 08 101412Z
ACTION SS-01

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SSO-01 /002 W
-----070014 101413Z /38

O 101316Z MAR 90
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0138

INFO MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD

S E C R E T SECTION 03 OF 08 MOSCOW 08211

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, MARR, PARM, PGOV, NATO, WPO, UR, GC, GE
SUBJECT: SOVIET VIEWS ON THE FUTURE STATUS OF GERMANY:

THEIR ENTIRETY" (THAT NATO AND WTO WOULD BECOME "POLITICAL," SO THERE WAS NO NEED TO BARGAIN ABOUT WHERE GERMANY WOULD BE). THEY STRESSED THAT THERE WOULD BE NEW POSITIONS ON THE SUBJECT. EVEN IN SHEVARDNADZE'S LATEST COMMENTARY ON GERMANY (MARCH 11 OGONYOK), HE REVEALS THAT THE GOVERNMENT "INTENDS TO PUBLISH SOON" ITS VIEWS ON THE PROBLEMS OF GERMAN UNIFICATION.

LONG-TERM: A NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

12. THE LONG-TERM DESIRES OF THE USSR REGARDING EUROPEAN SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS ARE QUITE CLEAR. THE SOVIETS HOPE TO SUPPLANT THE CURRENT POST-WAR ALLIANCES WITH A NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE CONSTRUCTED UNDER THE CSCE FRAMEWORK (REF C). THEY ARE NOT ALONE IN THIS DESIRE AND HAVE WELCOMED THE SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 08211 03 OF 08 101412Z

PROPOSALS OF MANY EUROPEAN NATIONS, INCLUDING GDR PREMIER MODROW AND FRG FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER, TO MOVE TOWARD THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW PAN-EUROPEAN BODIES. IN THIS REGIME, AS GORBACHEV EXPLAINED, THERE WOULD BE NO NEED FOR A DEBATE OVER WHERE A UNITED GERMANY BELONGED.

13. THE DILEMMA LIES IN THE FACT THAT THE PACE TOWARD GERMAN UNIFICATION NOW FAR EXCEEDS PROGRESS TOWARD ESTABLISHING NEW PAN-EUROPEAN STRUCTURES. SOVIET PRESS COMMENTATORS HAVE ARGUED THAT GERMAN UNIFICATION MUST BE TACKLED SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE EXPANSION OF THE EUROPEAN PROCESS. SHEVARDNADZE TERMED THIS "SYNCHRONIZATION," IN HIS MARCH 7 INTERVIEW WITH "NEUE BERLINER ILLUSTRIERTE." BOTH HE AND GORBACHEV HAVE STRESSED THE NEED TO SPEED UP NEW SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR EUROPE AND TO SLOW DOWN THE RACE TOWARD GERMAN UNIFICATION. FEW IN MOSCOW BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT GERMAN UNIFICATION CAN BE PUT OFF UNTIL SUCH STRUCTURES ARE ESTABLISHED.

SHORT-TERM: A HOST OF TROUBLING OPTIONS

14. SHEVARDNADZE TOLD "IZVESTIYA" (FEBRUARY 20) THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD A "STOCK OF OPTIONS," BUT PROVIDED NO EXAMPLES. THERE IS A WIDE RANGE OF POSSIBLE POLITICAL-MILITARY OPTIONS FOR A UNITED GERMANY -- INCLUDING FULL NATO MEMBERSHIP, AN ASSOCIATED NATO MEMBERSHIP (SIMILAR TO THAT OF FRANCE), MEMBERSHIP IN BOTH NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT, NEUTRALITY, A NON-NATO U.S. ALLY AND
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 08211 03 OF 08 101412Z

DEMILITARIZATION. EACH POSSIBILITY, HOWEVER, FALLS SHORT OF FULLY ADDRESSING SOVIET NEEDS.

OPTION A - FULL NATO MEMBERSHIP

15. THIS OPTION WOULD REPRESENT A MAJOR HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL DEFEAT FOR THE USSR. TO THE SOVIET PEOPLE, IT WOULD UNDERSCORE THE IMPOTENCE OF THE WARSAW PACT AND COULD BE SEEN AS FINAL PROOF THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD LOST THE COLD WAR. THERE COULD ALSO BE NO DOUBT THAT FULL NATO MEMBERSHIP FOR A UNITED GERMANY WOULD PLACE CONSIDERABLE POLITICAL PRESSURE ON THE CURRENT LEADERSHIP, RAISING FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS ABOUT HOW WELL GORBACHEV AND SHEVARDNADZE HAD PROTECTED THE SECURITY OF THE USSR.

16. BOTH THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION HAVE TAKEN CLEAR STANDS ON THE QUESTION OF FULL NATO MEMBERSHIP, INCREASING THE POLITICAL CAPITAL AT STAKE. THE MORE GORBACHEV AND SHEVARDNADZE HAVE SAID THAT NATO MEMBERSHIP IS UNACCEPTABLE, THE STRONGER THE SOVIET PUBLIC -- AND THE NEW LEGISLATURE -- WILL BE EXPECTED TO OPPOSE SUCH A DECISION. IN FACT, GORBACHEV'S INTERPRETER, PAVEL PALZHCHENKO, RECENTLY COMPLAINED THAT THE SOVIETS HAD BEEN FORCED INTO A CORNER ON THIS QUESTION BY THE EARLY PUBLIC INSISTENCE BY THE WEST THAT THE GERMANY-NATO RELATIONSHIP WOULD NOT CHANGE.

17. THERE IS A DISTINCT SPLIT BETWEEN INTELLECTUALS

SECRET

NNNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 08211 04 OF 08 101412Z
ACTION SS-01

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SSO-01 /002 W
-----070034 101414Z /38

O 101316Z MAR 90
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0139
INFO MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD

S E C R E T SECTION 04 OF 08 MOSCOW 08211

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, MARR, PARM, PGOV, NATO, WPO, UR, GC, GE
SUBJECT: SOVIET VIEWS ON THE FUTURE STATUS OF GERMANY:

AND THE PUBLIC ON THIS OPTION. SOME ACADEMICS HAVE INSISTED THAT THE INCLUSION OF GDR TERRITORY IN NATO WOULD NOT IMPAIR THE SECURITY OF THE USSR TO ANY DEGREE. THEY HAVE ARGUED THAT SOVIET SECURITY IS ASSURED BY ADEQUATE CONVENTIONAL FORCES AND SIZEABLE STOCKS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. KEY MEMBERS OF THE DEFENSE AND FOREIGN POLICY COMMITTEES OF THE SUPREME SOVIET, HOWEVER, HAVE ARGUED THAT THIS WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO SELL TO THE SOVIET PEOPLE. VALERIY OCHIROV, DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE DEFENSE AND STATE SECURITY COMMITTEE RECENTLY DECLARED THAT SUCH AN OUTCOME WOULD BE A "NIGHTMARE."

18. PROPOSALS TO DATE TO SWEETEN THIS POLITICALLY BITTER PILL HAVE ALSO BEEN DEEMED INSUFFICIENT. SHEVARDNADZE DECLARED THAT FRG FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER'S PROPOSAL THAT NATO TROOPS WOULD NOT BE DEPLOYED ON FORMER GDR TERRITORY WAS "ARTIFICIAL." SIMILARLY, VITALIY KORIONOV WROTE IN "PRAVDA" ON
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 08211 04 OF 08 101412Z

MARCH 2 THAT THIS WOULD NOT DISPEL SOVIET CONCERN, DEEMING THE "PLOT" NON-CONSTRUCTIVE.

OPTION B - ASSOCIATED NATO MEMBERSHIP

19. SEVERAL CONTACTS AT THE MFA AND INSTITUTES VIEW THIS A LIKELY COMPROMISE, MEETING WESTERN INSISTENCE THAT NATO MEMBERSHIP CONTINUE, WHILE ACCOMMODATING SOVIET CONCERNS ABOUT MILITARY AGGRESSION. THE TYPICAL SCENARIO IS THAT A UNITED GERMANY WOULD FOLLOW THE EXAMPLE OF FRANCE AND REMOVE ITSELF FROM NATO'S INTEGRATED MILITARY STRUCTURE. FURTHERMORE, ADDITIONAL CONCESSIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE IN THE TWO PLUS FOUR PROCESS TO APPEASE PUBLIC CONCERNS THAT GERMANY COULD POSE A THREAT TO SOVIET SECURITY INTERESTS. THESE COULD INCLUDE LIMITS ON THE SIZE OF GERMAN FORCES, RESTRICTIONS ON DEPLOYMENTS ON FORMER GDR TERRITORY, OR EVEN THE REMOVAL OF ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM GERMAN SOIL.

20. ALTHOUGH APPEALING AS A COMPROMISE, SOME CONTACTS HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THIS COULD SERVE TO STRENGTHEN FRANCO-GERMAN MILITARY COOPERATION AND COULD LEAD TO THE PERCEPTION (IF NOT THE TRUTH) THAT THE BUNDESWEHR HAD JOINED HANDS WITH THE FORCE DE FRAPPE. THE ONLY REAL INSURANCE AGAINST THIS WOULD PRESUMABLY BE THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF U.S. AND SOVIET FORCES.

OPTION C - BOTH IN NATO AND THE PACT

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 08211 04 OF 08 101412Z

21. THIS OPTION HAS BEEN RAISED OCCASIONALLY IN PUBLIC DEBATE, BUT HAS RECEIVED LITTLE SERIOUS ATTENTION. THE IDEA BEHIND IT IS THAT AS BOTH NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT BECOME PRIMARILY POLITICAL BODIES, AND EAST-WEST TENSIONS FURTHER REDUCE, THERE WOULD BE NO CONTRADICTION TO DUAL-MEMBERSHIP. OVERALL, HOWEVER, THE OPTION IS VIEWED AS PATENTLY UNREALISTIC (THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE VIEWED AS LESS PLAUSIBLE IS A UNITED GERMANY IN THE WARSAW PACT). FURTHERMORE, SOME BELIEVE THAT WERE MEMBERSHIP IN BOTH ALLIANCES TO BE MAINTAINED, IT COULD BRING ABOUT A FUSION OF THE BUNDESWEHR AND THE NATIONAL VOLKSARMEE, WHICH IS UNWANTED. THE SOVIETS HOPE TO SEE THE SIZE OF THE GERMAN ARMED FORCES REDUCED UNDER

ANY SECURITY ARRANGEMENT.

OPTION D - A NEUTRAL STATE

22. THIS REMAINS THE LEADING PUBLICLY-VOICED OPTION FOR THE SOVIETS. NEVERTHELESS, IN PRIVATE THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO EXPRESS SERIOUS RESERVATIONS ABOUT WHETHER NEUTRALITY IS A REALISTIC OPTION. REPORTEDLY, THE SOVIETS STOPPED RAISING THE QUESTION OF A NEUTRAL STATUS WITH THE FRG AFTER KOHL AND GENSCHER'S FEBRUARY VISIT TO MOSCOW. FURTHERMORE, MOSCOW ACADEMICS ARE NOT DISCUSSING NEUTRALITY AT ALL. ONE FRG EMBASSY CONTACT SAID THAT SHEVARDNADZE LABELLED THIS A "GOOD OLD IDEA," BUT NOW STRESSED THAT A CONCEPT CONDUCTIVE TO WESTERN IDEAS WAS NEEDED. EVEN IN PUBLIC SHEVARDNADZE HAS SAID THAT NEUTRALITY IS A GOOD IDEA, BUT WHETHER IT IS

SECRET

NNNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 08211 05 OF 08 101413Z
ACTION SS-01

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SSO-01 /002 W
-----070040 101414Z /38

O 101316Z MAR 90
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0140
INFO MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD

S E C R E T SECTION 05 OF 08 MOSCOW 08211

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, MARR, PARM, PGOV, NATO, WPO, UR, GC, GE
SUBJECT: SOVIET VIEWS ON THE FUTURE STATUS OF GERMANY:

REALISTIC IS ANOTHER STORY (FEBRUARY 27, "NEW TIMES"). POLITICAL COMMENTATOR BOVIN HAS ALSO POINTED OUT THAT DESPITE THE LOGIC AND PSYCHOLOGY BEHIND THIS POSITION, "QUITE CONSIDERABLE DOUBTS REMAIN."

23. MANY ACADEMICS ARGUE THAT FULLY BREAKING GERMANY OUT OF NATO WOULD UPSET THE BALANCE OF POWER IN EUROPE MORE THAN WOULD ADDING THE TERRITORY OF THE GDR TO NATO. THERE IS CONCERN THAT NEUTRALITY WOULD LEAD TO AN UNTETHERED GERMANY, WHOSE INCREASED POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC POWER COULD EASILY UNDERMINE EUROPEAN STABILITY. SOVIET WARSAW PACT ALLIES (ESPECIALLY POLISH PREMIER MAZOWIECKI) HAVE HIGHLIGHTED THEIR DESIRE THAT GERMANY BE FIRMLY EMBEDDED IN THE EUROPEAN PROCESS (THESE SENTIMENTS HAVE ALSO BEEN ECHOED IN THE WEST). WHILE THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY SERVES THIS FUNCTION IN THE ECONOMIC REALM, MANY BELIEVE THAT ONLY NATO CAN
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 08211 05 OF 08 101413Z

SUCCEED -- IN THE SHORT-TERM -- IN DOING SO POLITICALLY AND MILITARILY. IN ANY CASE, THE SOVIETS PRESUME THAT SIZEABLE NUMBERS OF TROOPS -- U.S., SOVIET AND POSSIBLY OTHERS -- WOULD REMAIN IN A NEUTRAL GERMANY DURING THE TRANSITION TO NEW EUROPEAN STRUCTURES.

OPTION E - NOT IN NATO, BUT CLOSE U.S. ALLY

24. AN ADDITIONAL OPTION WHICH HAS RECEIVED LITTLE ATTENTION IS THE IDEA THAT A UNITED GERMANY WOULD WITHDRAW FROM NATO, BUT WOULD NOT ASSUME A TRULY NEUTRAL STATUS. INSTEAD IT WOULD MAINTAIN A POWERFUL BILATERAL POLITICAL AND MILITARY RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S. THIS WOULD SERVE TO MEET SOVIETS DESIRES THAT GERMANY NOT BE IN NATO, WHILE ADDRESSING CONCERNS OF A NEUTRAL GERMANY ADRIFT. IT WOULD PROBABLY ENTAIL THE REMOVAL OF ALL NON-U.S. NATO FORCES FROM GERMANY, LEAVING THE AMERICAN FORCES IN SIZEABLE NUMBER AND A SYMBOLIC SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IN GERMANY'S FORMER EASTERN ZONE.

OPTION F - DEMILITARIZATION

25. THE SOVIETS RECOGNIZE THAT A COMPLETE DEMILITARIZATION OF GERMANY WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE GERMANS THEMSELVES, LET ALONE THE WESTERN ALLIANCE. EVEN WERE IT ACCEPTABLE, IT IS THOUGHT

THAT THIS WOULD CREATE AN UNMANAGEABLE POWER VACUUM
IN CENTRAL EUROPE. SIMPLY CONSIDERING IT, RAISES THE
FEAR OF REPEATING THE MISTAKES MADE AT VERSAILLES
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 08211 05 OF 08 101413Z

THAT LED TO THE LAST WAR. WE NOTE THAT CONSIDERATION
OF MORE LIMITED DEMILITARIZED ZONES HAS ALSO FALLEN
LARGELY ON DEAF EARS. A CONTACT AT THE GDR EMBASSY
NOTED THAT WHEN SPEAKING OF A POSSIBLE DEMILITARIZED
EASTERN ZONE OF GERMANY, HIS SOVIET INTERLOCUTER
RESPONDED THAT WOULD WORK AS WELL AS THE
DEMILITARIZATION OF THE RHINELAND DID IN 1936.

26. SHEVARDNADZE, IN HIS MARCH 7 "NEUE BERLINER
ILLUSTRIERTE" INTERVIEW MADE CLEAR THAT BY
"DEMILITARIZATION" THE SOVIETS DID NOT MEAN COMPLETE
DISARMAMENT, BUT THE CREATION OF CONDITIONS WHEREBY
AGGRESSION FROM GERMAN TERRITORY WOULD BE
IMPOSSIBLE. THE SOVIETS EXPECT TO SEE THE SIZE OF
THE GERMAN ARMED FORCES REDUCED AND BELIEVE AMERICAN
AND SOVIET FORCES WILL REMAIN ON GERMAN TERRITORY FOR
AN INTERIM PERIOD. IN FACT, LAST WEEK DEPUTY DEFENSE
MINISTER SHABANOV AND SUPREME SOVIET DEFENSE
COMMITTEE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OCHIROV STRESSED THAT THE
PRESENCE OF SOVIET TROOPS IN WHAT WAS THE GDR WOULD
BE ESSENTIAL DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD.
FURTHERMORE, THEY ARGUED THAT THESE TROOPS MUST
REMAIN IN GERMANY AS LONG AS U.S. TROOPS REMAIN.

WEIGHING THE OPTIONS

27. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE ABOVE OPTIONS, THERE IS
LITTLE SURPRISE AS TO WHY THE SOVIETS HAVE HAD
TROUBLE DECIDING ON A FIRM POLICY DIRECTION. WHAT
THEY WANT -- GERMAN UNIFICATION TO WAIT FOR THE NEW
EUROPE TO ARISE -- THEY CANNOT HAVE. WHAT THEY CAN

SECRET

NNNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 08211 06 OF 08 101413Z
ACTION SS-01

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SSO-01 /002 W
-----070054 101415Z /38

O 101316Z MAR 90
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0141
INFO MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD

S E C R E T SECTION 06 OF 08 MOSCOW 08211

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, MARR, PARM, PGOV, NATO, WPO, UR, GC, GE
SUBJECT: SOVIET VIEWS ON THE FUTURE STATUS OF GERMANY:

HAVE EASILY -- FULL NATO MEMBERSHIP FOR A UNITED GERMANY -- THEY DO NOT WANT. WHAT REMAINS IS A GRAB-BAG OF PARTIAL MEASURES WHICH EITHER DO NOT ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THEIR POLITICAL REQUIREMENTS OR ARE POLITICALLY UNOBTAINABLE FROM THE TWO PLUS FOUR PROCESS. IN THE END, THE SOVIETS WILL HAVE TO CHOOSE BETWEEN THE LEAST UNPALATABLE OPTIONS -- BOTH FROM A SECURITY AND A POLITICAL STANDPOINT -- TO DETERMINE WHICH GO FURTHEST TOWARD MEETING THESE NEEDS IN THE INTERIM PERIOD.

POSSIBLE STRATEGY FOR TWO PLUS FOUR

28. WE BELIEVE THERE MAY BE A SUBSTANTIAL MARGIN FOR SOVIET NEGOTIATION IN THE TWO PLUS FOUR PROCESS ON THE FUTURE STATUS OF A UNITED GERMANY. AS DETAILED ABOVE, THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT YET ADOPTED A FINAL
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 08211 06 OF 08 101413Z

POSITION, NOR COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT ONLY ONE POSSIBLE OUTCOME WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE. DECLARING FULL NATO MEMBERSHIP AS UNACCEPTABLE, GORBACHEV APPEARS TO HAVE LAID DOWN A MAXIMUM POSITION AS AN OPENING GAMBIT. WE SUSPECT THAT THE TWO OPTIONS WHICH MAY MOST APPEAL TO THE SOVIETS, AND WHICH THEY THINK MIGHT BE OBTAINED, ARE:

-- A UNITED GERMANY WHICH IS NOT IN NATO, BUT IS CLOSELY ALLIED TO THE U.S OR

-- A GERMANY ASSOCIATED WITH NATO, BUT NO LONGER PARTICIPATING IN THE INTEGRATED MILITARY STRUCTURE. BOTH OPTIONS WOULD ENABLE THE REGIME TO ARGUE THAT CORRESPONDING REDUCTIONS OF MILITARY POTENTIAL TOOK PLACE IN EACH ALLIANCE. FURTHERMORE, AS EACH OUTCOME WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY INCLUDE THE CONTINUING PRESENCE OF U.S. AND SOVIET TROOPS IN GERMANY FOR THE INTERIM PERIOD, THE PROBLEM OF AN "UNANCHORED" POWER IN CENTRAL EUROPE WOULD NOT BE REALIZED.

29. WHETHER THESE OUTCOMES COULD BE ACHIEVED IN THE TWO PLUS FOUR PROCESS, HOWEVER, REMAINS TO BE SEEN. ALTHOUGH THE SOVIETS BELIEVE FRANCE SHOULD BE WILLING FOR ITS GERMAN NEIGHBOR TO ASSUME THE SAME STATUS VIS-A-VIS NATO AS IT HAS, THE SOVIETS EXPECT THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE U.S. WILL PUSH HARD FOR FULL NATO MEMBERSHIP. A UNITED GERMANY, OUTSIDE OF NATO, THEREFORE WOULD HAVE TO BE REGARDED AS A VERY HARD SALE. CONVERSELY, AS THE SOVIETS REMAIN OFFICIALLY OPPOSED TO ANY FORM OF NATO MEMBERSHIP FOR GERMANY, THEY COULD DEMAND SIGNIFICANT CONCESSIONS FROM THE WEST FOR GERMANY TO MAINTAIN AN ASSOCIATED MEMBERSHIP.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 08211 06 OF 08 101413Z

SOVIET MINIMUM DEMANDS

30. WE HAVE ALREADY RECEIVED SOME INDICATION OF WHAT THE SOVIETS BELIEVE IS THE MINIMUM BOTTOM LINE FOR GERMAN UNIFICATION TO PROCEED. A PROVEN CONTACT IN THE MFA ARMS LIMITATION AND DISARMAMENT ADMINISTRATION DETAILED TO US FOUR POINTS THAT HIS ADMINISTRATION HAD RECOMMENDED TO SHEVARDNADZE AS ESSENTIAL TO SOVIET SECURITY: CONFIRMATION OF EXISTING EUROPEAN BORDERS, NO NATO FORCES IN THE EASTERN ZONE OF GERMANY, NO GERMAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND A SYMBOLIC SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE DURING THE TRANSITION (SEE REF D). CONTACTS AT THE FRG EMBASSY HAVE SUGGESTED THAT THESE DEMANDS SHOULD NOT POSE A PROBLEM. THE BORDER ISSUE IS MOVING TOWARD RESOLUTION AND THE GENSCHER PLAN PROVIDES FOR NO NATO FORCES IN THE EAST. FURTHERMORE, THE GERMANS HAVE HINTED THAT SOVIET TROOPS IN THE EASTERN ZONE FOR A 4-5 YEAR PERIOD COULD BE REGARDED AS AN ACCEPTABLE CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURE. FINALLY, THE KOHL GOVERNMENT (AND THE MODROW GOVERNMENT FOR THAT

MATTER) GOVERNMENT APPEAR PREPARED TO REAFFIRM THEIR
COMMITMENT TO THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY.

MORE DIFFICULT POSSIBLE SOVIET REQUESTS

SECRET

NNNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 08211 07 OF 08 101414Z
ACTION SS-01

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SSO-01 /002 W
-----070056 101415Z /38

O 101316Z MAR 90
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0142
INFO MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD

S E C R E T SECTION 07 OF 08 MOSCOW 08211

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, MARR, PARM, PGOV, NATO, WPO, UR, GC, GE
SUBJECT: SOVIET VIEWS ON THE FUTURE STATUS OF GERMANY:

31. WHILE THE MINIMAL SOVIET DEMANDS SHOULD NOT PROVE
IMPOSSIBLE TO MEET, THE PRICE THE SOVIETS MAY SEEK
FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP -- FULL OR ASSOCIATED -- COULD BE
APPRECIABLY HIGHER. AMONG THE VARIOUS IDEAS WE HAVE
HEARD FLOATED ARE: NO NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHATSOEVER ON
GERMAN SOIL, A CALL FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL
NON-U.S. NATO FORCES FROM GERMANY, A REDUCTION IN THE
SIZE OF THE BUNDESWEHR, A PACKAGE OF ECONOMIC
INCENTIVES (I.E. A PICK UP BY GERMANY OF THE GDR'S

CEMA OBLIGATIONS) AND GERMAN FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE IN MAINTAINING SOVIET TROOPS IN GERMANY. AS REGARDS THE LATTER, IT HAS NOT GONE UNNOTICED HERE THAT THE FRG HAS BEEN PICKING UP THE TAB FOR CLOSE TO 30,000 ALLIED TROOPS IN BERLIN.

STRONG PUSH FOR "SYNCHRONIZATION"

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 08211 07 OF 08 101414Z

32. THE MOST OBVIOUS SOVIET TACTIC IN THE COMING MONTHS WILL BE TO CONTINUE EFFORTS IN SUPPORT OF "SYNCHRONIZATION" -- ASSURING THAT GERMAN UNIFICATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF NEW EUROPEAN STRUCTURES GOES HAND-IN-HAND. THE SOVIETS SHOULD BE EXPECTED TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE IN THE TWO PLUS FOUR PROCESS TO SLOW DOWN GERMAN INTEGRATION WHEN THEY CAN, ARGUING THAT THIS IS NEEDED TO MAINTAIN OVERALL EUROPEAN STABILITY, AS WELL AS TO PROTECT OF THE RIGHTS OF GDR CITIZENS. BOTH GORBACHEV AND SHEVARDNADZE HAVE TOUCHED ON THESE DESIRES IN THE PAST FEW DAYS.

33. GORBACHEV EMPHASIZED THE NEED FOR A STAGE-BY-STAGE APPROACH TO UNIFICATION IN HIS MARCH 6 DISCUSSIONS WITH GDR PREMIER MODROW. SHEVARNADZE IN HIS "NEUE BERLINER ILLUSTRIERTE" INTERVIEW WENT FARTHER, WARNING AGAINST ANY ATTEMPT TO BRING ABOUT ANNEXATION OF THE GDR UNDER ARTICLE 23 OF THE FRG BASIC LAW. THIS IS THE QUICKEST PATH TO UNIFICATION, BUT ONE WHICH MOSCOW REGARDS AS FRAUGHT WITH POLITICAL DANGER (WE NOTE THAT TO CHANCELLOR KOHL IT IS THE ONLY ACCEPTABLE PATH - REF E). SHEVARDNADZE EVEN RAISED THE SPECTRE THAT ARTICLE 23 COULD BE APPLIED TO "OTHER AREAS OF GERMANY" WHICH LIE OUTSIDE THE GDR AND FRG. ADAMISHIN, IN HIS MARCH 2 PRIVATE DISCUSSION WITH KASTRUP, WAS EVEN MORE DIRECT INQUIRING WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF KALININGRADSKAYA OBLAST' (NOW PART OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, BUT FORMERLY PART OF EAST PRUSSIA) OR AUSTRIAN TIROL SOUGHT ACCESSION VIA ARTICLE 23.

34. AS FOR BUILDING NEW PAN-EUROPEAN STRUCTURES, TOP SOVIET LEADERS HAVE READILY EMBRACED THE PROPOSALS
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 08211 07 OF 08 101414Z

PUT FORTH BY BOTH GERMANIES -- FOR EXAMPLE, THE GDR'S

LENGHTY MEMORANDUM OF FEBRUARY 28, WHICH DETAILED POSSIBLE NEW CSCE STRUCTURES. MOSCOW REMAINS COMMITTED TO A SUMMIT OF THE 35 CSCE NATIONS THIS YEAR TO CONSIDER THIS QUESTION (BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE U.S. ON THESE QUESTIONS ARE TAKING PLACE MARCH 12-13). ALTHOUGH THE SOVIETS RECOGNIZE THAT THESE STRUCTURES CANNOT BE ESTABLISHED OVERNIGHT, THEY HOPE TO OBTAIN A COMMITMENT FROM THE THIRTY-FIVE AT THE SUMMIT TO BEGIN REGULAR MEETINGS OF CSCE FOREIGN MINISTERS AND TO ESTABLISH SOME PERMANENT CSCE BODIES (REF C).

SOLUTION MUST BE SELLABLE TO THE PEOPLE

35. SEVERAL MFA CONTACTS HAVE ARGUED THAT REGARDLESS OF WHAT DECISION IS REACHED ON A UNITED GERMANY'S FUTURE POLITICAL-MILITARY STATUS, THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP MUST BE ABLE TO CONVINCING ITS PEOPLE THAT ON BALANCE THE SECURITY OF THE USSR HAS NOT DIMINISHED. THIS IS NOT SIMPLY A QUESTION OF ASSURING THE WARTIME GENERATION THAT THEIR SACRIFICES WERE NOT MADE IN VAIN. WORLD WAR II REMAINS A POWERFUL POLITICAL EVENT FOR THE AVERAGE SOVIET CITIZEN. THE LOSS OF RELATIVES IS STILL FELT BY A SIGNIFICANT PERCENTAGE OF THE POPULATION; REMINDERS OF THE CONFLICT ARE HAMMERED HOME DAILY IN BOOKS AND FILMS, AND BY UBIQUITOUS WAR MEMORIALS.

SECRET

NNNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 08211 08 OF 08 101414Z
ACTION SS-01

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SSO-01 /002 W
-----070075 101416Z /38

O 101316Z MAR 90
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0143
INFO MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD

S E C R E T SECTION 08 OF 08 MOSCOW 08211

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, MARR, PARM, PGOV, NATO, WPO, UR, GC, GE
SUBJECT: SOVIET VIEWS ON THE FUTURE STATUS OF GERMANY:

36. THIS HAS ALREADY PROVEN PROBLEMATIC WITH THE
DRAMATIC CHANGES UNDERWAY IN EASTERN EUROPE --
INCLUDING AGREEMENTS TO WITHDRAW ALL SOVIET FORCES
FROM CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND HUNGARY BY JULY 1991. IN HIS
FEBRUARY 21 "PRAVDA" INTERVIEW, GORBACHEV POINTED OUT
THAT REAL MILITARY DANGER HAS BEEN REDUCED
CONSIDERABLY AS A RESULT OF POLITICAL FACTORS. HE
ADDED THAT THE AGREEMENT REACHED IN OTTAWA TO WORK
TOWARD A CEILING OF 195,000 IN CENTRAL EUROPE HAD
HELPED IN THIS REGARD. NEVERTHELESS, SOME MILITARY
LEADERS ARE CONVINCED THAT HARD WON GAINS ARE BEING
LOST IN THE SHUFFLE. GENERAL IGOR SERGEYEV (DEPUTY
COMMANDER- IN-CHIEF OF THE STRATEGIC ROCKET FORCES),
FOR EXAMPLE, ARGUED IN "MOSCOW NEWS", MARCH 4, THAT
THE COMING CHANGES IN THE WARSAW PACT SPELL A LOSS
FOR THE USSR AND THAT "ALL THE THEORETICAL LOGIC
ABOUT REPLACING THE MILITARY-POLITICAL ALLIANCE WITH
A POLITICO-MILITARY ONE COMES AS POOR CONSOLATION.
THIS IS A PLAY ON WORDS."

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 08211 08 OF 08 101414Z

AND GERMANY WILL BE A HARD SELL

37. CONVINCING THE SOVIET PEOPLE THAT ANY GERMAN
SOLUTION IS A POSITIVE ONE FOR THE USSR SHOULD PROVE
QUITE DIFFICULT. ONE MFA CONTACT SAID THAT NATO
MEMBERSHIP MAY SIMPLY "BE MORE THAN THE PUBLIC COULD
STOMACH." OTHERS HAVE NOTED THAT NEUTRALITY COULD
EASILY REVIVE FEARS OF HISTORY REPEATING ITSELF.
THIS IS EVEN MORE LIKELY AS THE SOVIET PRESS HAS
FOCUSSED INCREASED ATTENTION ON THE ACTIVITIES OF
RIGHT-WING AND NEO-FASCIST GROUPS IN BOTH THE FRG AND
GDR (SEE NEW TIMES, JANUARY 23). IN FACT, AN MFA
CONTACT CHARACTERIZED CHANCELLOR KOHL'S UNWILLINGNESS
TO RESOLVE THE POLISH BORDER QUESTION AS CLEAR PROOF

THAT REVANCHIST GROUPS ALREADY WIELDED SOME POWER OVER THE GOVERNMENT. ON MARCH 3, SOVIET TELEVISION SHOWED VIEWERS A MAP OF 1937 GERMANY, POINTING OUT THAT THIS INCLUDED SOVIET TERRITORY, THEREBY DRIVING HOME THE FACT THAT THIS IS NOT JUST POLAND'S PROBLEM.

38. THE SOVIETS SHOULD BE EXPECTED TO BARGAIN HARD IN THE TWO PLUS FOUR PROCESS TO OBTAIN COMPROMISES WHICH CAN CONVINCE THE PEOPLE THAT DESPITE GERMAN UNIFICATION THE REGIME HAS BROUGHT THE USSR ENHANCED SECURITY. GORBACHEV WILL WANT TO BE ABLE TO SHOW CLEARLY TO ALL THAT SOVIET SECURITY INTERESTS HAVE NOT BEEN SOLD DOWN THE RIVER.

FUNDAMENTAL POSITIONS ON GERMANY HAVE SHIFTED
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 08211 08 OF 08 101414Z

39. WHETHER THE SOVIETS CAN BE PERSUADED TO ACCEPT GERMAN MEMBERSHIP IN NATO IS OPEN TO QUESTION, BUT GORBACHEV HAS SHOWN THAT HE CAN SHIFT FUNDAMENTAL POSITIONS -- EVEN ON GERMANY -- QUICKLY. THOUGH IN OCTOBER IN BERLIN GORBACHEV WAS WILLING TO REFER TO THE GDR AS HISTORICALLY THE "EASTERN PART OF GERMANY," A LOADED PHRASE HERE, IN DECEMBER THE USSR STILL FIRMLY OPPOSED GERMAN UNIFICATION, ARGUING THAT SUCH A MOVE WOULD THREATEN TO DESTABILIZE THE EUROPEAN BALANCE. GERMAN UNITY IS NOW CONSIDERED A FOREGONE CONCLUSION HERE. THE SOVIETS ARE NOW ARGUING AGAINST NATO MEMBERSHIP FOR A UNITED GERMANY ON THE SAME GROUNDS.

40. LENINGRAD MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. MATLOCK

SECRET

NNNN