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ACTION EUR-00

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GEIR GADE - DEFENSE COMMAND, OPERATIONS AND EXERCISE
BRANCH;
JARL JONSEN - NDRE UNDERWATER DIVISION DIRECTOR;
TORFINN SANDVIK - DEFENSE COMMAND

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INFO LOG-00 ACDA-17 ACDE-00 AID-00 AMAD-01 CEQ-00 CIAE-00
SMEC-00 COME-00 OASY-00 DINT-01 EB-00 E-00 FBIE-00
H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-10 JUSE-00 LAB-01 SAL-00
L-00 ADS-00 MMP-00 M-00 NRC-01 NRRC-00 NSAE-00
NSF-01 OES-09 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-00 PRS-01
P-01 SB-00 SCT-00 SP-00 SSO-00 SS-00 TRSE-00
T-00 USIE-00 EPAE-00 SNIS-00 NISC-01 SSD-01 PMB-00
DRL-09 G-00 /063W

OPENING REMARKS

RELEASED IN FULL

R 201438Z MAR 95
FM AMEMBASSY OSLO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1509
SECDEF WASHDC//OSD-ISP/OSD-ISA/USDA (ES)/ATSD (AE) //
INFO NSC WASHDC
SECNAV WASHDC//ASN (RD&A)/ONR/DNI//
JCS WASHDC//J-5//
DOE WASHDC//EM/NE//
CINCSNAVEUR LONDON UK//POLAD//
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ4/ECJ5/POLAD//
USMISSION USMATD
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

DECONTROLLED

C O N F I D E N T I A L OSLO 001463

DEPT. PASS TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

E. O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: MNUC, MARR, PREL, SEUV, US, RS, NO
SUBJECT: MARCH 13-17 TRILATERAL EXPERTS MEETING ON
ARCTIC MILITARY ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION

REF: (A) STATE 58226 (B) MOSCOW 7662

1. (C) SUMMARY. THE FIRST AMEC SESSION DEMONSTRATED DIVERGENT VIEWS AMONG THE PARTICIPANTS ON HOW TO PROCEED WITH REGARD TO MILITARY NUCLEAR WASTE IN THE BARENTS AND KOLA REGIONS. HOWEVER, SUFFICIENT INTEREST WAS SHOWN IN THE PROCESS TO ALLOW THE SIDES TO AGREE TO A SECOND SESSION IN WASHINGTON IN JULY. U.S. BRIEFINGS WERE WELL-REGARDED BY ALL PARTICIPANTS AND DEMONSTRATED THE DEGREE OF OPENNESS WHICH THE NORWEGIANS DESIRE FROM THE RUSSIANS AS WELL AS PROVIDING THE RUSSIANS AN OVERVIEW OF U.S. PROGRAMS ON WASTE DISPOSAL AND RELATED TOPICS. THE RUSSIANS THEMSELVES APPEARED ILL-PREPARED FOR THE SESSIONS AND WERE FREQUENTLY DEFENSIVE ABOUT THE SITUATION ON THE KOLA. THE MAIN LINE OF THEIR ARGUMENTS WAS THAT RADIOACTIVE WASTE DOES NOT REPRESENT A PRESENT OR FUTURE THREAT, AND THAT DELAYS AND PROBLEMS IN DISPOSAL ARE NOT TECHNICAL OR PROGRAMMATIC PROBLEMS, BUT SOLELY AN ISSUE OF FUNDING. END SUMMARY.

DELEGATIONS

2. (U) U.S. DELEGATION - SEE REFTEL A

RUSSIAN DELEGATION - SEE REFTEL B

NORWEGIAN DELEGATION - ODDVIN HORNELAND, MOD RESOURCE DIVISION;
OLAV BERSTAD - NORWEGIAN EMBASSY MOSCOW; SCIENCE AND ENVIRONMENT OFFICER;
FRODE FONUM - NORWEGIAN DEFENSE RESEARCH ESTABLISHMENT (NDRE);
KNUT GUSSGARD - NORWEGIAN RADIATION PROTECTION AGENCY;
PER KRISTIAN PEDERSEN - MFA RESOURCE DIVISION;

3. (U) IN THEIR OPENING REMARKS, THE NORWEGIAN DELEGATION EXPLAINED THAT THEIR CONCERN FOR RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION OF THE ARCTIC STEMS FROM THEIR PROXIMITY TO THE REGION, THE POTENTIAL DAMAGE TO THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF THE ARCTIC BASIN, AND THE PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF THE RISKS OF A POTENTIAL NUCLEAR ACCIDENT IN THE REGION. FURTHER, THE NORWEGIANS STATED THAT THEIR GOAL FROM THIS MEETING WAS TO BEGIN A PROCESS OF A SERIES OF MEETINGS THAT WILL RESULT IN SOME TYPE OF FORMAL AGREEMENT AND, ULTIMATELY, IN SOME TYPE OF ACTION.

4. (U) IN THEIR OPENING, THE RUSSIANS NOTED THAT THEIR COUNTRY IS NOT THE ONLY SOURCE OF RADIOACTIVE POLLUTION IN THE WORLD, AND SUGGESTED THAT THE U.S. LIKEWISE CONTRIBUTED. THEY ARE INTERESTED IN HEARING U.S.

EXPERIENCES IN DEALING WITH THESE PROBLEMS.

5. (U) FOR THE U.S., CAPT SHAW OUTLINED THREE OBJECTIVES FOR THE MEETING: (1) TO BEGIN A DIALOGUE AMONG THE THREE MINISTRIES OF DEFENSE (MOD) ON THESE ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES, (2) TO ESTABLISH A FRAMEWORK FOR FUTURE POTENTIAL COOPERATION, AND (3) TO IDENTIFY POTENTIALLY UNIQUE CONTRIBUTIONS THE RESPECTIVE MILITARIES COULD MAKE IN THE RESOLUTION OF THESE ISSUES.

ASSESSMENT OF ARCTIC DUMPING

6. (U) ON THE SUBJECT OF ARCTIC RADIOACTIVE DUMPING, THE NORWEGIANS STATED THAT SAMPLING OVER THE PAST FEW YEARS SHOWED LOW RADIOACTIVE LEVELS AND THAT THEY NEED NOT PURSUE FURTHER GENERAL EXPEDITIONS TO THE KARA SEA. HOWEVER, THE NORWEGIANS REQUESTED GREATER RUSSIAN MOD PARTICIPATION BY PROVIDING INFORMATION ON SOURCE TERMS, THE STATUS OF STORED NUCLEAR CORES (FROM AND IN SUBMARINES) IN THE KOLA REGION, AND RIVERINE SOURCES RESULTING FROM THE RUSSIAN SPENT FUEL REPROCESSING FACILITIES.

7. (U) THE RUSSIAN DELEGATION RESPONDED THAT A STUDY

CONDUCTED BY THEIR MINISTRY OF ATOMIC ENERGY (MIN-ATOM) CONCLUDED THAT THE OB AND YENISEY RIVERS DO NOT HAVE ANY RADIOACTIVE IMPACT ON THE ARCTIC, AND NOTED THAT THE

STUDY'S REPORT IS EXPECTED IN MAY 1995. FURTHER, THE TOPIC OF RIVER TRANSPORT AND ARCTIC CONTAMINATION IS A TOPIC THAT RUSSIAN SPECIALISTS ARE CURRENTLY STUDYING AND DOES NOT NEED REPEATING.

8. (U) LCDR EDSON'S PRESENTATION ON THE ARCTIC NUCLEAR WASTE ASSESSMENT PROGRAM (ANWAP) SPURRED QUESTIONS BY THE RUSSIANS ABOUT ARCTIC RADIOACTIVE RISKS FROM U.S. AND NON-RUSSIAN (E.G. BRITISH) SOURCES. FURTHER, THE RUSSIANS INQUIRED WHO IN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT (IF ANYONE) WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR CLEANING UP WHATEVER CONTAMINATION WAS DISCOVERED FROM THE RESULTS OF HIS STUDIES.

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Donna M. DiPaolo, Senior Reviewer

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9. (U) THROUGHOUT THE CONFERENCE, THE BRITISH SELLAFIELD REPROCESSING FACILITY HAS REFERRED TO AS A KEY CONTRIBUTOR TO RADIOACTIVITY IN THE ARCTIC. THE RUSSIAN DELEGATION URGED THE NORWEGIANS AND AMERICANS TO PRESS THE BRITISH FOR INFORMATION SIMILAR TO THAT BEING REQUESTED FROM THE RUSSIANS (I.E., SOURCE TERMS, RISK, ETC.).

ENVIRONMENTAL RISK ASSESSMENT

10. (U) DENIS RUSHWORTH'S PRESENTATION ON THE ENVIRONMENTAL RISK ASSESSMENT OF PORTSMOUTH NAVAL SHIPYARD SPURRED A SERIES OF QUESTIONS BY THE RUSSIAN DELEGATION ON THE LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVITY THAT IS MEASURED, MONITORED, OR CONTROLLED BY THE U.S. NAVY. THE RUSSIANS WERE SURPRISED THAT U.S. LAW DOES NOT HAVE

A LOWER LIMIT ON WHAT MUST BE CONTROLLED AS RADIOACTIVE WASTE (THAT IS, IF YOU CAN MEASURE ANTHROPOGENIC RADIATION, THE MATERIAL IS TREATED AS RADIOACTIVE WASTE).

KEY POINTS

11. (U) THE EXCHANGE AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE FIRST DAY'S SESSION SHOWED A PATTERN REPEATED THROUGH THE WEEK. THE NORWEGIAN DELEGATION, ATTEMPTING TO SUMMARIZE THE DAY'S WORK, EMPHASIZED THREE POINTS:

(1) THERE IS A NEED FOR MORE DATA ON THE CHARACTERISTICS AND STATUS OF THE RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS DUMPED IN THE ARCTIC BASIN.

(2) IT IS IMPORTANT FOR THE RESPECTIVE MILITARIES AND GOVERNMENT AGENCIES TO COMMUNICATE EFFECTIVELY THE RESULTS OF STUDIES AND FINDINGS TO ALLAY PUBLIC CONCERNS.

(3) SOME OF THE FUTURE WORK THAT REMAINS TO BE DONE ON THESE ISSUES INCLUDES SOURCE TERM CHARACTERIZATION, RISK ASSESSMENT, AND MONITORING.

12. (U) THE RUSSIAN DELEGATION OBJECTED TO THIS SUMMARY, ARGUING THAT THERE IS NO PROBLEM CURRENTLY, AND THUS THE NEED FOR MORE DATA IS UNFOUNDED. SECONDLY, THE ROLE OF THE PRESS CANNOT BE MINIMIZED, AS EXEMPLIFIED BY THE 15 JANUARY CONFERENCE IN BRUSSELS ON THE

KOMSOMOLETS. THIRDLY, THE RUSSIANS REPEATED THAT THEY HAVE SPECIALISTS IN THEIR COUNTRY WORKING ON ISSUES OF SOURCE TERMS, RISK ASSESSMENT, MONITORING, ETC., AND THAT THE STUDY WILL BE OUT IN MAY, 1995. THIS WILL BE AN UPDATE TO THE YABLOKOV REPORT. LASTLY, THE RUSSIAN DELEGATION EMPHASIZED THAT IT WAS UNCLEAR WHAT ROLE THE MOD'S (AND THEIRS IN PARTICULAR) HAVE IN THE RESOLUTION OF THESE ISSUES.

SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT

13. (U) THE U.S. OPENED THE SECOND DAY WITH A WELL-RECEIVED DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY PRESENTATION. THE RUSSIANS AND NORWEGIANS REQUESTED COPIES OF SEVERAL PUBLICLY AVAILABLE REPORTS REFERENCED DURING THE PRESENTATION (SEE PARA 32 ACTION REQUEST).

14. (U) THE RUSSIAN PRESENTATION ON THE ISSUE OF SPENT

FUEL MANAGEMENT DEMONSTRATED A CLEAR COMMITMENT TO REPROCESSING AS THEIR PRIMARY WASTE MANAGEMENT STRATEGY. THEY ARE COMMITTED TO A SECOND REPROCESSING CANYON, RT-2, AND CONSTRUCTION OF PERMANENT STORAGE FOR FUELS WHICH CANNOT BE REPROCESSED. WHEN PRESSED ON THE ISSUE OF SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT IN THE NORTHERN REGIONS, THE RUSSIANS REPLIED THAT THEY ARE DEVELOPING A PLAN TO RESOLVE THE BACKLOG OF SHIP SPENT FUEL, AND WITH NORMAL ECONOMIC CONDITIONS, HOPE TO BE CAUGHT UP OVER THE NEXT 3-5 YEARS.

15. (U) WHILE AGREEING THAT RADIOACTIVE WASTE WAS AN IMPORTANT ISSUE AND CLEARLY THE FOCUS OF THIS MEETING, THE RUSSIAN MINATOM OFFICIAL OFFERED THAT A MORE IMPORTANT QUESTION MAY BE THAT OF CHEMICAL POLLUTION AND OTHER HAZARDOUS WASTES.

MURMANSK INITIATIVE

16. (U) THE RUSSIANS WERE ASKED WHETHER, IF THE UPGRADE IS IN FACT COMPLETED, THE NAVY WOULD UTILIZE THE FACILITY. RUSSIAN REAR ADMIRAL URYVSKIY RESPONDED OBLIQUELY THAT THE U.S. CONTRACTORS INVOLVED MAY NOT BE FULLY AWARE OF THE SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RUSSIAN LOW-LEVEL LIQUID WASTE, AND NOTED THAT IN JAPAN, THE CONTRACTORS WERE NOT, AND THUS THE RUSSIANS HAD TO DESIGN THE FACILITY THEMSELVES. A SPECIFIC ANSWER TO THE QUESTION WAS NOT PROVIDED.

NAVAL NUCLEAR SUBMARINES

17. (U) THE U.S. PRESENTED AN UNCLASSIFIED VERSION OF THE NAVAL NUCLEAR PROPULSION PROGRAM'S PROCESS FOR PERFORMING SUBMARINE DISMANTLEMENT AND SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT.

18. (U) REAR ADMIRAL URYVSKIY OFFERED AN "OFF THE CUFF" BRIEFING ON RUSSIAN SUBMARINE DISMANTLEMENT SYSTEM IN TURN. HE EXPLAINED THAT THE RUSSIAN PROCESS WAS

SUBSTANTIALLY SIMILAR TO THE AMERICAN. BUT HE EXPLAINED THAT WHILE THE RUSSIAN NAVY BELIEVES IT POSSESSES THE TECHNICAL ABILITY TO DO THIS PROCESS, THERE ARE TWO OUTSTANDING ISSUES: (1) THE BACKLOG OF SPENT FUEL AWAY (2) LONG-TERM STORAGE FOR REACTOR COMPARTMENTS. HE STATED THAT THESE ISSUES HAD BEEN RAISED AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF THEIR GOVERNMENT, AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED IN THEIR GOVERNMENT ON MARCH 14. WHEN THEY RETURN TO MOSCOW, THEY SHOULD HAVE AN ANSWER AND BE ABLE TO BEGIN WORK ON THESE ISSUES. SPECIFICALLY, THE RUSSIANS STATED THAT THEY EXPECT TO MAKE A DECISION ON A SITE FOR ULTIMATE REACTOR COMPARTMENT DISPOSAL BY THE END OF THE YEAR (SEE ALSO PARA 14).

19. (U) WHEN QUERIED ON THE STATUS OF THE NORTHERN FLEET, THE ADMIRAL REPLIED THAT OF THE APPROXIMATELY 70 NUCLEAR SUBMARINES DECOMMISSIONED SO FAR, APPROXIMATELY 20 OF THEM HAVE ALSO BEEN DEFUELED. HE ALSO STATED THAT THE ISSUE OF NAVY SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT WAS GETTING HIGH NATIONAL VISIBILITY, THAT THIS ISSUE HAD BEEN DEBATED IN THEIR GOVERNMENT JUST TWO WEEKS AGO, AND THAT PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN HAD STATED THAT THIS PROBLEM MUST BE SOLVED.

20. (U) WHEN QUERIED ON THE SUBJECT OF THE DEPLETED

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FUEL STORAGE VESSEL LEPSE, THE RUSSIANS STATED THAT THEY ARE CONSIDERING BURIAL OF THE LEPSE ON THE SOUTHERN COAST OF NOVAYA ZEMLYA. LATER, THEY STATED THAT THE BURIAL OF THE LEPSE WAS IN FACT A PILOT PROJECT UNDER REVIEW, AND THAT A DECISION ON WHETHER TO UTILIZE NOVAYA

ZEMLYA AS A FUTURE REACTOR COMPARTMENT REPOSITORY WILL DEPEND ON RESULTS FROM THIS STUDY.

21. (U) URYVSKIY FURTHER STATED THAT SUBMARINES WITH SPENT FUEL STILL ON-SHIP ARE NOT AN ENVIRONMENTAL THREAT TO NORWAY, THAT THEY ARE SAFE, AND THAT THEY HAVE CREWS ON-BOARD TO MONITOR THEIR SAFETY. THE ONLY THING THEY LACK IN COMPLETING THE SUBMARINE DISMANTLEMENT PROCESS IS MONEY. WHEN THE NORWEGIANS PRESSED IF THERE WAS ANY

TECHNOLOGY OR OTHER TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE THAT WAS LACKING WHICH COULD FACILITATE THIS PROCESS, THE RUSSIAN REPLY WAS AGAIN, "MONEY."

22. (U) AFTER THESE EXCHANGES, THE NORWEGIANS CONTINUED TO PRESS FOR MORE INFORMATION ON RUSSIAN NAVAL FUEL MANAGEMENT IN THE KOLA REGION (STATUS OF SUBMARINES, SPENT FUEL, RISK OF CRITICALITY, ETC.). IN RESPONSE, THE RUSSIANS REITERATED, WITH SOME HEAT, THEIR CONTENTION THAT NORWAY WAS SINGLING THEM OUT, WHEN THE EVIDENCE SHOWED THAT THE BRITISH SELLAFIELD PLANT WAS A LARGER CONTRIBUTOR TO ARCTIC RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION THAN ANY RUSSIAN SOURCE. FURTHER, THE RUSSIANS DID NOT BELIEVE ADDITIONAL DATA WOULD ACCOMPLISH ANYTHING. REAR ADMIRAL URYVSKIY EXPRESSED IRRITATION THAT THE NORWEGIAN DELEGATION WAS UNABLE TO IDENTIFY ANY MEASURABLE RISK TO NORWAY FROM RUSSIAN NAVY ACTIVITIES YET CONTINUED TO PRESS FOR MORE DATA. THE ADMIRAL CONCLUDED THAT MORE DATA WOULD PROVIDE NO BENEFITS.

CIVILIAN NUCLEAR POWER

23. (U) THE NORWEGIANS PRESENTED A REPORT ON THE RISKS FROM CIVILIAN NUCLEAR POWER, AND THEIR CONCLUSIONS WERE THAT NORWAY-RUSSIA COOPERATION IN THIS AREA WAS PROGRESSING SMOOTHLY. THERE WAS NO NEED FOR GREATER DETAIL ON THIS SUBJECT, AND THE ONLY REMAINING HURDLES WERE PRIMARILY LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE IN NATURE TO ALLOW MORE TIMELY DELIVERY OF REACTOR UPGRADE EQUIPMENT TO RUSSIA. TO THIS END, THE NORWEGIANS EXPLAINED THAT IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE FOR THE RUSSIAN AUTHORITIES TO MAKE AN OFFICIAL STATEMENT ON LIABILITY.

24. (U) WHEN PRESSED ON THE SUBJECT OF POWER STATION SAFETY, MINATOM'S REPRESENTATIVE REPLIED THAT, UNDER CURRENT PLANS, THEY HAD A PROGRAM TO IMPROVE THE SAFETY OF VVER-440 AND RBMK REACTORS TO BRING THEM UP TO WESTERN STANDARDS, AND THAT THE IAEA HAD FOUND THEIR PROGRAM ACCEPTABLE.

BIG TIME FINANCIAL BLUES

25. (LOU) AN OVERALL RUSSIAN THEME THROUGHOUT THE CONFERENCE WAS THAT THEIR PROBLEMS WERE SIMILAR TO THOSE OF THE U.S. AND THE ONLY DIFFERENCE IS THAT THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY CAN NOT AFFORD TO SUPPORT AS MUCH WORK AS CAN THE AMERICAN.

NEXT STEPS

26. (U) THE U.S. DELEGATION OFFERED TO HOST THE NEXT TRILATERAL MEETING IN WASHINGTON SOMETIME IN THE SUMMER OF 1995.

ANALYSIS AND OBSERVATIONS

27. (LOU) THE RUSSIANS DID NOT MAKE ANY PRESENTATIONS (NO VIEW GRAPHS OR PREPARED TEXT), AND ONLY RESPONDED TO

PRESENTATIONS MADE BY THE U.S. AND NORWAY. THESE RUSSIAN PRESENTATIONS TENDED TO BE VERY BROAD BRUSH IN NATURE AND WERE DESIGNED TO EMPHASIZE THE SIMILARITY BETWEEN THE RUSSIAN AND AMERICAN PROGRAMMATIC SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS OF WASTE DISPOSAL, EVEN THOUGH THE RUSSIAN PROGRAMS LAG MARKEDLY IN IMPLEMENTATION.

28. (U) WITH REGARD TO DISMANTLEMENT OF RUSSIAN NUCLEAR POWERED SUBMARINES, THE RUSSIANS EMPHASIZED THAT THEY HAVE A PLAN AND THE TECHNOLOGY TO EXECUTE IT, BUT THEY LACK THE FINANCIAL RESOURCES.

29. (LOU) THE RUSSIANS WERE VERY DEFENSIVE ABOUT THEIR PROGRAMS AND CLEARLY WANTED TO DIVERT ATTENTION TO THE LARGER CURRENT POLLUTION PROBLEMS IN THE REGION, AS THEIR FREQUENT REFERENCES TO SELLAFIELD SHOWED. MOREOVER, THEY ARGUED THAT THE U.S. WEAPONS COMPLEX MUST HAVE SOME RADIOACTIVE RELEASE THAT AFFECTS THE ARCTIC

ENVIRONMENT AND THEY WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE U.S. BE AS

"OPEN" WITH ITS EXPERIENCES AS THEY ARE.

30. (C) THE NORWEGIANS, ON THE OTHER HAND, OBVIOUSLY HAD NO CONFIDENCE IN VERBAL ASSURANCES FROM THE RUSSIANS AND PRESSED FOR MORE INFORMATION ON RUSSIAN MARINE (NAVY AND ICEBREAKER FLEET) FUEL MANAGEMENT AND SUBMARINE DISMANTLEMENT TO THE POINT OF PROVOKING AN ANGRY RUSSIAN REJECTION OF THE REQUESTS. THE LONG-TERM NORWEGIAN OBJECTIVE APPEARS TO BE TO GAIN THE SAME ACCESS TO, FOR EXAMPLE, DECOMMISSIONED BUT NOT YET DEFUELED SUBMARINES, THAT THEY EVENTUALLY GAINED TO RUSSIAN WASTE DUMPING SITES IN THE KARA SEA EAST OF NOVAYA ZEMLYA.

COMMENT

31. (C) THE THREE SIDES EACH CLEARLY HAD SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT VIEWS OF BOTH THE PROBLEM AND THE WAY TO ADDRESS IT. THE NORWEGIANS, FOR REASONS STATED IN PARA 3, WERE CONSIDERABLY MORE CONCERNED THAT RUSSIAN MILITARY ACTIVITY COULD LEAD TO LONG-TERM OR CATASTROPHIC ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE. THE U.S., WHILE RECOGNIZING THE INADEQUACY OF PAST AND PRESENT RUSSIAN PRACTICE AND THE NEED FOR IMPROVEMENT, DID NOT REGARD THE THREAT AS AS DANGEROUS OR IMMINENT AS THE NORWEGIANS CHARACTERIZED IT. THE RUSSIANS, WHO APPARENTLY HAD DONE LITTLE ADVANCE WORK FOR THE CONFERENCE, WERE PRIMARILY CONCERNED, AS NOTED, WITH DIVERTING AND REFUTING

ASSERTIONS THAT RUSSIAN PRACTICES MIGHT BE A THREAT AND WITH SEEKING RESOURCES FOR DISMANTLEMENTS, STORAGE, ETC.

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32. (U) DOE-ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT AGREED TO PROVIDE

COPIES OF THE FOLLOWING DOCUMENTS TO THE DELEGATES:

DOE STRA

TEGIC PLAN; TECHNOLOGY PLAN; VULNERABILITY PLAN

OF ACTION; "CLOSING THE CIRCLE"; AND SPENT FUEL DATA

BASE. LOFTUS

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